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ABSTRACT 
As part of the larger energy market deregulation program, the Dutch energy authority – 
DTe – has developed the habit to force the Dutch gas transport enterprise – Gas Transport 
Services, or GTS – to lower its prices. DTe’s key argument is that lower gas transport 
prices will benefit the end-user. Indeed, that might well be the case. This policy, in 
general, is in line with European legislation on the liberalization of the gas market. We 
model and simulate the (domestic) welfare effects of a five per cent transport price 
reduction. From this, we conclude that at least three observations complicate matters 
substantially. First, GTS is government-owned, and the dominant shipper – Gasunie 
Trade & Supply (or GasTerra, as it was recoined recently) – is partly so (50 %). Second, 
shippers enter into the competitive game to make profits. Third, not only is the majority 
of gas transported in the Netherlands exported to foreign end-users, but also foreign 
owners have a large stake in Dutch shippers. As a result, part of the rents will always be 
distributed, or will ‘leak’ away, to foreign consumers and shippers (or their shareholders). 
These three observations together have three important implications. First, state 
ownership implies that much rent allocation is simply a matter of circulating money from 
one government sub-budget to the other. Second, given that the industry is imperfectly 
competitive, part of the rents will not be passed on to the end-consumers. Third, it is 
unavoidable that a substantial part of the rents are transferred abroad. A general 
conclusion for policy-makers is that market liberalization might not bring ex post what 
they expected ex ante. 
 
Keywords: regulatory policy, market form, rent allocation
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2006, Regulation (EC) 1775/2005 on access conditions to the gas 
transmission network became active. The central aims of this Regulation are to organize  
tariffs, access to the network for third parties, capacity allocation and congestion 
management, transparency requirements, and safeguards for delivery. In general, the aim 
of the European Commission (EC) was to reduce potential disruptions in gas supply (see 
the so-called “Green paper” – EC 2000/769, 2000), but also to liberalize the market (EC 
2003-55). In the slipstream of European Union policies, the Dutch government is 
finalizing deregulation and re-regulation of the energy market. The deregulation of the 
gas market is inextricably bound up with re-regulation (for a nice introduction of another 
example, see García, 2006). In the Netherlands, the DTe has been established as the 
energy market’s regulator.1 One of its tasks is, so to speak, to set prices for gas transport 
and distribution (from high to low-pressure services). Indeed, in recent years the DTe has 
introduces a series of price reductions, which have cumulated to about 34 per cent (in real 
terms) since DTe’s involvement in the gas transport business as of 2005. In this paper, we 
analyze how such a price reduction affects the allocation of welfare, with an emphasis on 
the impact on domestic welfare.  
 
In the gas industry, the Dutch case is special, since the Netherlands are one of Europe’s 
main gas producers. As a consequence, the Dutch state is heavily involved in the gas 
business. As of March 2004, Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst, the then Dutch Minister of 
Economic Affairs, introduced far-fetching plans to unbundle the Dutch gas and electricity 
market. The central idea was to separate network management from commercial activities 
                                                 
1 For the sake of brevity, we will not engage in the huge discussion about the pros and cons of deregulation 
and re-regulation in the energy and gas industries. For a critical overview, please consult, e.g., MacAvoy 
(2000). 
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(Baarsma et al., 2007). Central in this policy are three measures that are aimed to improve 
the functioning of the gas trade market: the network operator (GTS) facilitates trade by 
means of the so-called Title Transfer Facility (administrative aid), to increase 
transparency with respect to inflows and outflows of gas in the transport network, and to 
facilitate access for market parties to the network (EZ , 2006). This, in fact, implements 
EC regulations for the Dutch market (see also EC, 2000, EC 2005; for a survey, see 
Mulder and Zwart, 2006).  
 
In the Dutch case, the organization took the form of the creation of Gas Transport 
Services B.V. (GTS), which was founded on July 2, 2004. It is the network operator of 
the Dutch national gas transmission system. GTS is a fully-owned subsidiary of N.V. 
Nederlandse Gasunie. The mission of the Gasunie is clearly to promote the Netherlands 
as a European gas hub (Gasunie, 2007). Currently, they are the full owner of the high and 
mid-pressure gas transport (henceforth referred to as transport, for short)2 enterprise and 
the 50 per cent owner of the largest shipper and trader. Ownership of the latter – Gasunie 
Trade & Supply – is shared with Royal Dutch Shell (25 %) and ExxonMobil (25 %).3 
Moreover, an array of specific regulations (in, e.g., the area of taxes4) were and still are in 
place. In the context of the current analysis, we largely abstract from the latter. That is, 
                                                 
2 Low-pressure gas transport services are provided by, basically, a series of local monopolies, or so-called 
regional network operators, that connect end-users with the country’s gas “highway”, which is operated for 
approximately 99 per cent by GTS. To complicate matters further, many regional network operators are 
active as a shipper and trader as well (e.g., Essent and Nuon). This paper focuses on the “highway” only, as 
will be explained in greater detail below. 
3 Until recently, both enterprises were unified under the Gasunie roof, with an ownership arrangement 
similar to Gasunie Trade & Supply’s. On September 1, 2006, Gasunie Trade & Supply changed its name 
into GasTerra in order to prevent confusion between Gasunie (transport and infrastructure) and GUTS 
(trade). As our data deal with 2005, we stick to the old name. 
4 Taxes introduce much complexity without changing the qualitative outcomes of our analyses (cf. the 
discussion section). Indeed, gas-related taxes are very complicated, as is clear from the way gas producers 
are treated in the context of the so-called MOR (acronym for “MeerOpbrengstRegeling”, or “Added 
Revenues Regulation”). 
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we focus on the broader issues, ignoring many nitty-gritty details that – if included – 
would not affect the main conclusions of the analysis presented below. However, after 
introducing and discussing the heart of this paper, we will briefly reflect upon the likely 
bias introduced by our key abstractions in a separate discussion section with sensitivity 
analyses before turning to the appraisal.  
 
Our methodology involves a scenario analysis. Building upon a simulation model, 
applying economics’ theory of competition, we calculate the rent distribution after a one-
shot price reduction of five per cent for four different scenarios. We restrict ourselves 
strictly to the implications of DTe on GTS, and not on the impact of other relevant 
aspects of deregulations and market forms on production, (Stiglitz and Dasgupta, 1982) or 
R&D (Nakada, 2005). In this sense, production decisions are taken as given. The central 
aim of allowing for more competition in the energy market is to benefit consumers. 
However, given the market structure in the energy markets, that might not happen, as EC 
policies to date have resulted in large energy multinational enterprises. The paradoxical 
effect might be price increases instead of decreases, or that price decreases leak away to 
consumers in other countries.  
 
The latter might be an unintended side-effect for a national government. In case of the 
Netherlands, the recent policy of making the Netherlands a “gas hub” might make this 
side-effect a very real problem: investments in the Dutch transport system may especially 
benefit foreign consumers, rather than Dutch consumers. This change in focus of the 
Gasunie might be rational in a transition process towards a true multinational firm that 
concentrates less on production, and more on the distribution of gas (EZ, 2006). From a 
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global welfare perspective, this might be beneficial, even if it does not benefit national 
consumers specifically. However, a national government is first and foremost responsible 
for the citizens it represents. The aim of the present paper is to highlight the consequences 
of liberalizing the gas transport market for national consumers and foreign consumers, 
without judgement as to the most preferable option.  
 
Below, we will first provide the background information that we used to inform our 
model building exercise. After that, we will introduce our scenario analysis. 
Subsequently, as promised above, we will reflect briefly upon the implications of our 
main abstractions in a discussion section, partly by running sensitivity analyses. Finally, 
we will conclude with an appraisal, in which we will discuss the outcomes and 
implications of our simulation scenario analyses. 
 
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
For the development of a plausible simulation model of the Dutch gas transport market, 
we need basically two types of information.5 The first piece of essential information 
relates to the role of different parties, or players, in the gas chain (from “put to pit” in 
Dutch, that is from “well to burner”). All gas must be transported through GTS’ system, 
which is organized in a market with 50 so-called shippers. This paper focuses on this 
shipping market. In Figure 1 the Dutch gas chain is summarized by distinguishing five 
key gas flows, defined by the location of the gas’s entry and exit points: 
1. Flow I is import, where gas produced abroad is brought into the Dutch system, and 
ultimately delivered to a Dutch client. 
                                                 
5 The information introduced below was provided by GTS. Much of the information we use here is simply 
not available in the public domain, given its confidential and deconsolidated nature. 
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2. Flow II relates to export, where Dutch gas is transferred from the Netherlands to a 
foreign destination. 
3. Flow III involves transit, where gas is imported into and exported out of the 
Netherlands without any domestic ‘leakage’. 
4. Flow IV deals with domestic production and supply, where gas is distributed within 
the Netherlands from a supplier to a buyer. 
5. Flow V has to do with a ‘virtual hub’ (TTF), where gas is traded but not really 
transported. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In practice, the Dutch gas transport system is much more complicated. Here, two 
complications are worth mentioning. Firstly, as hinted at above, all transport of gas from 
entry point i to exit point j is done by so-called shippers. Shipper a buys gas transport 
capacity from GTS,6 and subsequently ships gas from entry point i to exit point j to serve 
a client b (assuming that shipping capacity is given for the time frame we are 
considering). From the perspective of the current analysis, we need to distinguish 
domestic from foreign shippers, and domestic from foreign clients. At the supply side, we 
initially ignore upstream producers, starting our analysis with the government’s gas 
transport enterprise GTS. In a broad sense, this assumption reflects the notion of the 
Dutch government that production of gas in OECD countries becomes less important, 
whereas production of gas in Russia, Northern Africa, and the Middle East becomes more 
important. These developments increase, potentially, the role for the Netherlands as an 
international gas hub (EZ, 2006). At the demand side, for the time being, we abstract 
                                                 
6 Approximately one per cent of the Dutch gas transport capacity is not in the hands of GTS – i.e., the 
Zebra-pipeline in the Noord-Brabant province. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore this small player, and 
model GTS as the country’s gas transport (public) monopolist. 
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from mid-stream parties (such as traders and regional network operators, like Essent and 
Nuon), and focus on end-consumers only, which may be either organizations or 
households.7 In the discussion, we briefly return to this issue. 
 
Secondly, we must calibrate our model with real-world data that quantify the importance 
of the different flows and parties involved. For this, we use the figures underlying the 
input-output table detailed in Table 1, relating to our “benchmark year 2005”8 
(guestimates dated April 2005). For our purposes, five pieces of information related to 
Table 1 are crucial: (i) GTS’s total turnover is roughly € 1,200 million; (ii) for the 
calculation purposes in the context of this study, Gasunie Trade & Supply’s shipping 
market share is taken to be about 80 per cent; (iii) total export + transit volumes involve 
54 from a total of 99 billion m3/j, which reflects approximately 55 per cent; (iv) in 
capacity terms, the export’s market share is about one third;9 and (v) at least 40 per cent 
of the commercial shipping market is foreign-controlled.10 Note that the foreign-owned 
shippers dominate the 20 per cent of the market that is not served by Gasunie Trade & 
Supply. In the discussion, we will check whether or not the outcomes of our scenario 
                                                 
7 Note that many regional network operators, which serve the end-users after receiving gas from GTS 
through their final pipeline tracks of the network, are still government-owned (though not by the national 
government, but rather by provinces and municipalities). 
8 To be precise, we work with estimates that reflect the current state of the art whilst taking notice of key 
trends. For example, data about 2005’s capacity of the gas transport network are combined with an estimate 
of GUTS’ market share for the near future. Note that, for the sake of confidentiality, Table 1 only reports 
qualitative information. For our simulation exercises, we could make use of the underlying quantitative 
information. 
9 The export’s market share in volumes (iii) is different from its share in €-terms because capacities (iv) 
rather than volumes are traded in the gas transport market. 
10 This percentage is calculated on the basis of a complete list of the 50 shippers that were active in the 
Netherlands in 2005. For the sake of confidentiality, this list is not appended to this paper. Note that a large 
chunk of foreign ownership is the result of ExxonMobil’s 25 per cent share in GUTS, which is assumed, in 
this study, to control 80 per cent of the Dutch shipping market. Moreover, the government’s 50 per cent 
ownership stake is excluded from this calculation (hence the “commercial” adjective), because we record 
the government’s rent separately (see below). Note that, to be on the safe side, we decided to work with a 
conservative estimate of foreign ownership. We will deal with this issue in greater detail in the discussion 
section as well. 
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analysis are robust for changes in a number of our key abstractions and assumptions as to 
ownership shares and tax policies. 
 
3. SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
In our analysis of the likely domestic welfare effects of the distribution of a five per cent 
reduction in transport costs for natural gas, we will distinguish five main players, namely 
the government, domestic shippers, foreign shippers, domestic end-consumers, and 
foreign end-consumers. As said, here we ignore complications not really essential for the 
results, such as taxes and the role of producers, traders and regional network operators.11 
Note that this modelling procedure is in contrast to the one used by Egging and Gabriel 
(2006): they assume strategic interaction between natural gas producers and perfect 
competition for transportation operators, whereas we take producer prices as given and 
assume strategic interaction between shippers. The key question is: how is the price 
reduction’s rent potential of € 60 million per year allocated over these five (groups of) 
players under different sets of assumptions (or scenarios)?12 The government plays a dual 
role since it is not only the single owner of Gas Transport Services (GTS), and as such 
pays directly for the five per cent reduction in transport costs as a result of loss of 
revenues, but it also operates as the 50 per cent owner of by far the largest shipper 
(Gasunie Trade & Supply), and as such potentially benefits from the cost reduction due to 
                                                 
11 These three groups of players are a ‘fixed’ component in the current analysis, as neither of them is 
assumed to be able to benefit from the allocation of the € 60 million after the five per cent transport price 
reduction. We will briefly return to this issue in the discussion. 
12 Welfare analyses can be very complicated (Baumol, 1986). Take the following pair of essential examples. 
First, a general equilibrium analysis would take account of the impact of changes in the gas transport 
market for all other markets in the economy. Our analysis is a partial equilibrium one: we restrict the 
argument to the gas transport market only. Second, the effect of a rent increment for player i is not 
necessarily welfare equivalent to such an increment for player j. We assume no such weight differences. 
Whoever loses or wins an extra € is not relevant in our argument: the welfare effect of this € is assumed to 
be equal for all parties, government, shipper and end-user alike. 
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increased profits. We take this dual role into consideration by netting the government’s 
costs and benefits.13  
 
At the shipper side, we distinguish foreign from domestic shippers, where we have 
labeled Royal Dutch Shell’s share in the largest shipper (Gasunie Trade & Supply) as a 
domestic shipper share and ExxonMobil’s as a foreign one, for the sake of simplicity.14 
As will become evident below, our analysis takes the large difference in size of the 
individual shippers into consideration, given Gasunie Trade & Supply’s dominant 
position with an 80 per cent market share, although our discussion will focus on the net 
effects for the five individual groups of agents identified above. Finally, we assume 
product homogeneity (that is, “gas is gas”), implying that end-consumers compare offers 
of shipper i vis-à-vis shipper j only along the price dimension.15 In this context, we start 
from the benchmark case of zero switching costs: that is, each and every end-consumer is 
willing to switch from shipper i to j even in response to infinitesmal price differences. 
With this set of assumptions in place, we maximize the potential threat of competition 
(see the discussion), ceteris paribus. This approach has as far as we know never been 
applied to the case of shippers, but the game-theoretic approach as such has a long history 
when the production of natural resources is concerned. In this sense, we extend this 
literature one step further in the supply chain from producer to consumer (see for a 
survey, Egging and Gabriel, 2006).  
                                                 
13 In effect, it is the Dutch Ministry of Finance that operates as GTS’s and the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
as GUTS’ shareholder. 
14 Strictly speaking, matters are much more complicated. For instance, in 2005, Royal Dutch Shell was 
formally 60 per cent Dutch and 40 per cent British. Including such subtleties would complicate our analyses 
substantially, without a significant impact upon our main results. For the current purposes, we decided not 
to complicate our analyses more than is strictly necessary. Note that this implies that our ‘leakage’ results 
are downward-biased because a substantial portion of Royal Dutch Shell’s profits flows to foreign owners. 
15 In practice, gas is heterogeneous with respect to the caloric value. We abstract from this complication and 
assume that demand does not switch between high and low-caloric value as prices change. 
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Our first two scenarios, A and B, simply assume that players behave either completely 
egoistically (A) or completely altruistically (B). We start our discussion regarding the 
distribution of the five per cent transport cost reduction with the most simple case, 
referred to as Scenario A or the Perfect Collusion Case. That is, we assume that shippers 
will not pass on any rent to their clients – in our abstraction, end-consumers. 
Additionally, we make a number of simplifying auxiliary assumptions, which will be 
discussed below. Suppose, then, (a) that the transport costs are the only relevant variable 
costs for each individual shipper, (b) that none of the individual shippers will adjust the 
price charged to the end-consumer, and (c) that there is perfect collusion among the 
shippers such that none of them changes the quantity supplied. Under those conditions, 
Table 1 depicts the distribution of benefits. Recall that about 40 per cent of the 
commercial (i.e., excluding the 50 per cent ownership share of the government, but 
including the 25 per cent share of ExxonMobil in Gasunie Trade & Supply) shippers is 
foreign-owned, and that one third of the end-consumers’ rent – if any – is passed along to 
foreign end-users. 
 
Obviously, the DTe would like the transport cost reduction to lower prices for the final 
consumers and, ideally, increase competition in the shipping market. Scenario B, also 
summarized in Table 2, focuses on this Perfect Competition Case, as it presumes that the 
entire reduction in gas transport costs is passed on to the end-consumers, under the 
assumption that there is no change in quantity demanded and no change in the distribution 
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of production across shippers. That is, the demand side’s price elasticity is taken to be 
zero16 and the shippers’ market shares are assumed to be constant.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Scenarios A and B present simple benchmark cases, but hardly take the competitive 
structure of the market into consideration. After all, the behavior of shippers was 
exogenously assumed to reflect either of both corner cases – i.e., perfect egoism or ditto 
altruism (cases A and B, respectively). There is, in fact, one dominant shipper in this 
market (Gasunie Trade & Supply, with an assumed market share of 80 per cent), though, 
accompanied by a few mid-sized and small companies (about 50 shippers altogether). The 
literature has extensively analyzed such dominant-firm markets, where the non-dominant 
firms – in our case, shippers – are referred to as the competitive fringe. The other 
scenarios we investigate are based on this dual market structure literature (cf. Tirole, 
1988; van Witteloostuijn & Boone, 2006).17 Now, that is, we will endogenously derive 
the actual behavior of the competitive fringe (Scenario C), or of the competitive fringe 
and Gasunie Trade & Supply in interaction (Scenario D). In so doing, we apply a modern 
theory of competition – i.e., a dual market with a dominant center and a competitive 
periphery – to the Dutch gas transport market that nicely fits with the latter’s key features. 
 
                                                 
16 This assumption is not too unrealistic, as end-users are not very flexible in their demand response to price 
changes. Moreover, transport costs only determine a very small portion of the gas price that emerges on the 
end-users’ bill.  
17 Technically, this literature applies so-called game theory (see, e.g., Rasmusen, 1990; van Witteloostuijn, 
2003). Game theory is the modern core of the economics of competition, or industrial organization. An 
example of a game-theoretic model of the European natural gas market is Egging and Gabriel (2006). In the 
current paper, we will simply introduce the basic equations needed to understand this paper’s simulation 
model, ignoring the underlying game-theoretic details. Although our simulation exercises basically involve 
comparative statics, comparing equilibrium outcomes across a number of relevant cases, we will add a 
dynamic intuition (particularly in explaining Scenarios C and D) to make clear what is really going on in 
the competitive games modeled here. 
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We assume the cost structure for the fringe shippers 50,...,2=i  to be equal to 
(1) 50,...,2,)1( =++ ixxF iiii λ . 
Here Fi indicates fixed costs, and )1( iii xx +λ marginal costs, which increase with output. 
This set-up rationalizes the stylized fact that the number of shippers is limited, and also 
that some of the shippers are large (see for an extensive discussion on production costs in 
relation to market forms, Brakman and Heijdra, 2004). The specific functional form 
facilitates subsequent calculations, incorporates the fact that there are returns to scale 
(fixed costs), and allows for adjustment of each shipper’s cost function to calibrate the 
model to reflect the size of each shipper. Note that iλ  is a flexible marginal cost 
parameter. We call this the efficiency parameter. Also observe that this, in principle, 
introduces potential efficiency gains in the market if inefficient shippers disappear. The 
dominant firm – competitive fringe model implies the assumption that the fringe shippers 
take the price p  set by the dominant shipper Gasunie Trade & Supply as given (which 
can be used for normalizations). Hence, equating marginal revenue and marginal cost for 
a fringe firm gives (ignoring intertemporal speculation on the gas market) 
(2) 50,...,2,)21( ==+ ipxiiλ . 
The total share of the 45 smallest shippers is about five per cent of the market. So, we 
denote their relative sales by 9/145/5 ==x  per cent for each small shipper. We 
measure the efficiency of all shippers relative to these smaller shippers, which gives: 
)21/()21( ii xx ++=λ  (such that 50,...,6,1 == iforiλ ).18 Thus, the efficiency of 
fringe shippers increases the larger their sales volume, which reflects a standard scale 
economies assumption. As a consequence, their market shares can only increase due to 
                                                 
18 Note that this implies a normalization of the price, p, of the dominant shipper. 
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relative efficiency gains. Below, we will develop two plausible scenarios that illustrate 
how, in practice, the actual outcomes of the rent distribution game will depend upon the 
underlying features of rivalry: in Scenario C, we assume that the dominant shipper 
Gasunie Trade & Supply will not respond to the smaller shippers’ behavior at all; in 
Scenario D, conversely, we will assume that it does react by lowering price. 
 
First, in Scenario C, we calculate the fixed costs of the fringe shippers on the basis of the 
initial assumption that none of the shipping firms earns positive profits (fixed-cost 
investments are thus a means to reduce variable costs). Hence, the model includes a trade-
off: lower marginal costs are associated with larger fixed costs. Initially, for the sake of 
normalization, fixed costs are thus determined by the zero-profit condition. That is, the 
gas transport market is assumed to be in a zero-profit equilibrium just before the five per 
cent transport cost reduction is launched. Subsequently, a competitive game is triggered 
in which both shipper parties – i.e., the dominant Gasunie Trade & Supply and the 
competitive fringe – engage in profit-maximizing behavior, given two different sets of 
behavioral assumptions (i.e., Scenarios C and D). Evidently, the smaller firms have lower 
overhead costs and are more flexible. Since the five per cent reduction in transport prices 
largely pertains to variable costs, we assume the efficiency gain (measured by the 
reduction in iλ ) to be proportional to the share of variable in total costs times five per 
cent. So, if variable costs are 80 per cent of total costs, the reduction in lambda is 5 % x 
80 %. It is therefore relatively larger for the smaller shipping firms in the market’s 
fringe.19  
                                                 
19 So, from Scenario C to D, we move more closely into the direction of the ‘competitive’ outcome that the 
government is seeking to bring about by deregulating the market. In both scenarios, we assume that 
competition comes from smaller and more flexible shippers that will attack the former monopolist’s (i.e., 
Gasunie Trade & Supply’s) dominant position. In Scenario C, competition only goes ‘halfway’, because 
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Under the assumption that the dominant Gasunie Trade & Supply shipper does not 
change the price for the end-consumers – i.e., the dominant shipper decides not to 
respond to the moves of its smaller rivals –, this implies that the fringe shippers will 
increase their sales at the expense of the market share of the dominant shipper by 
lowering their price. As a result, at a given price reduction, the smaller shippers will 
increase their market share at the expense of the dominant shipper (recall that total 
demand is assumed to remain unchanged). If there is (i) no change in the price charged to 
the final consumer by Gasunie Trade & Supply and (ii) no entry of new fringe shippers, 
the model’s simulation implies the loss in market share by the dominant shipper to be 1.3 
percentage points (see below). The distribution of benefits in this Dominance Erosion 
Case is summarized in Table 3.20 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The outcomes with a zero rent allocation to end-consumers and a 1.3 percentage point 
Gasunie Trade & Supply market share erosion only might, at first sight, be surprising. To 
understand this, we need to provide an intuition of the dynamics associated with the 
underlying competitive game. We do this in two steps. First, price competion is such that, 
given our assumption of behavioral asymmetry (i.e., Gasunie Trade & Supply is passive), 
the competitive fringe can maximize profit by launching an infinitesmall price cut. 
Suppose that Gasunie Trade and Supply’s price is p. Then, under the assumption of zero 
                                                                                                                                                  
price competition fails to materialize as Gasunie Trade & Supply does not respond to rivalry from the 
smaller shippers by reducing its price. In Scenario D, competition is fully brought to the fore, since then the 
dominant Gasunie Trade & Supply shipper plays the rivalry game by reducing its price. 
20 Note that now, in Table 3, the total rents may deviate from the original € 60 million as a result of the 
price effect triggered by the behavior of the fringe shippers and/or the dominant Gasunie Trade & Supply 
shipper. 
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switching cost at the demand side of the market, offering a p-ε with ε → 0 to end-
consumers is enough to attract the number of new clients needed to maximize profit. 
Second, as far as this profit-maximizing market share expansion is concerned, the 
competitive fringe faces the fixed cost – marginal cost tradeoff explained above, implying 
the danger of growing too large, given the nature of the fringe’s cost function. As a result, 
the competitive fringe will limit the market share increase to the profit-maximizing 
optimum, which turns out to be 1.3 percentage points. 
 
As explained above, it is likely that the reduction of transport costs makes it attractive for 
the smaller and more flexible shippers to increase their market share at the expense of the 
dominant shipping firm’s market position by lowering their price. This effect may be 
exacerbated if there is entry of new shippers into the market. It is, however, unlikely that 
the dominant shipper will not respond to its loss in market share. Instead, if the price 
charged to the final consumer is lowered by Gasunie Trade & Supply, the dominant 
shipper can prevent its market share from eroding. Scenario D, therefore, assumes that 
Gasunie Trade & Supply lowers the price charged to the final consumer to such an extent 
that the market share of this dominant shipper remains at 80 per cent. We estimate that 
this implies that about 2.6 percentage points of the five per cent reduction in transport 
costs is passed on to the consumer (which is 52 per cent of the total reduction).21 There is, 
in this Retaliation Response Case, a slight redistribution of market share among the fringe 
shippers, where the smallest ones will expand at the expense of their mid-sized 
counterparts. 
 
                                                 
21 For the end-consumer, this reduction is small relative to the total price charged for natural gas. The 
change in quantity traded is therefore minimal and the reduction mainly has a competitive impact. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
For sure, the above analyses are developed after introducing a series of abstractions and 
assumptions. On the one hand, this might imply that the above outcomes reflect a 
conservative estimation of the importance of rent ‘leakages’ – i.e., an underestimation of 
the relative size of the rents not allocated to the (Dutch) consumers. This can be 
illustrated by briefly discussing four of such key ‘conservative’ abstractions or 
assumptions: 
1. Implicitly, our conception of competition assumes the threat implied by low switching 
costs for end-consumers. That is, end-consumers are assumed to switch from shipper i 
to j if the latter is only marginally cheaper. This is what drives competition, and what 
puts pressure on the dominant shipper’s position. However, evidence suggests that 
many end-consumers are reluctant to switch, for whatever reason, hence failing to 
respond to price differences. 
2. We abstracted from a number of other parties that are involved in the gas delivery 
chain. For example, upstream producers and downstream traders are not part of our 
model. It might be, though, that in the vertical bargaining game within the industry 
chain such parties are able to reap part of the rents by negotiating higher (producers) 
or lower (traders) prices, and hence higher margins at the expense of end-users. 
3. We ignored the potential increase of the demand for transit transport in response to 
lower prices in the Netherlands vis-à-vis foreign (particularly German) pipelines. 
Such a substitution effect – from ‘domestic’ to transit transport – would imply that 
even more rents are passed on to foreign end-consumers.22 
                                                 
22 Another issue relates to the impact of a binding transport capacity. If GTS’s capacity is potentially 
binding (e.g., in years in which Jack Frost rules), the reliability of domestic delivery will be harmed if 
transit flows increase at the expense of domestic ones. 
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4. In deciding on the share of foreign ownership in the shipping market, we opted for a 
conservative assumption. For one, we took Royal Dutch Shell’s 25 per cent share in 
Gasunie Trade & Supply to be fully Dutch. Additionally, we assumed that only 40 per 
cent of the fringe shippers were foreign. In practice, though, the foreign share is larger 
– and hence is the ‘leak’ to shareholders abroad. 
 
On the other hand, though, at least two abstractions imply that the outcomes of our 
scenario analyses are upward biased (in the sense of overestimating ‘leakages’): (1) the 
government can skim part of the shippers’ rents through corporate taxes; and (2) with 
competition, the hope is that X-inefficiencies will be reduced. As a sensitivity check, we 
therefore recalculated our two ‘passive’ scenarios (A and B) after taking notice of, 
especially, the role of taxes (potentially reducing the upward bias) and traders (potentially 
decreasing the downward bias).  
 
Basically, we took the model underlying Scenarios A and B, and changed the analyses in 
two ways. First, we added (corporate) taxes and (mid-stream) traders, as indicated above. 
Second, we ran a series of sensitivity analyses by subsequently manipulating three key 
parameters: (i) the percentage of the cost reduction passed on to the next party in the gas 
chain by shippers and traders; (ii) the percentage of foreign ownership in the shipping 
market; and three (iii) complete privatization of Gasunie Trade & Supply. We added 
cases where only five percent of  Gasunie Trade & Supply’ rents were transferred abroad 
(correcting for a potential upward bias, given the dampening effect of the special tax 
arrangement that applies to  Gasunie Trade & Supply), we introduced scenarios in which 
the foreign ownership share in the fringe of the shipping market is assumed to be 75 per 
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cent (correcting for a potential downward bias, given the observation that foreign 
ownership is probably far above the 40 per cent assumed in Scenarios A to D), and we 
assumed that Gasunie Trade & Supply is privatized such that ExxonMobil and Royal 
Dutch Shell fully share ownership in a 50 – 50 per cent arrangement (simulating a 
completely privatized shipper market). We redid Scenario A (the Perfect Collusion Case) 
with four additional parameter settings: with privatization, as well as three different 
sensitivity checks. Scenario B (the Perfect Competition Case) is associated with one extra 
run – privatization –, as other parameter settings do not affect the outcome. Moreover, we 
added nine intermediate cases that approximate variants of Scenarios C and D, though 
now exogenously assuming the shippers’ (and traders’) behavior rather than 
endogenously deriving their profit-maximizing strategies (as we did above). Here, it 
suffices to observe that the above outcomes are indeed robust. Adding such complications 
and manipulations does not affect the qualitative pattern as to the effect of a five per cent 
price reduction on the rent distribution reported in Table 2 above. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Keeping the discussion’s remarks in mind, we can interpret our results as follows. As part 
of the larger energy market deregulation program, the DTe has developed the habit to 
force the Dutch near-monopoly gas transport enterprise – GTS – to lower its prices. The 
key argument is that lower gas transport prices will benefit the domestic end-user. Indeed, 
that might well be the case. However, at least three observations complicate matters 
substantially, as we illustrated above: 
1. Observation 1: government ownership. GTS is government-owned, and the dominant 
shipper – Gasunie Trade & Supply – is partly so (50 %). Hence, lost revenues from 
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the gas transport business will all emerge at the debit side of the government’s budget, 
and part of the shippers’ rent returns in the government’s pockets. 
2. Observation 2: imperfect competition. Firms enter into the competitive game to make 
profits. Shippers are not different. So, apart from the extreme cases of perfect 
competition (or, more generally, perfect contestability: cf. Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 
1982), part of the rents will end up in the pockets of the shippers, rather than the end-
consumers. 
3. Observation 3: rent export. The Netherlands are not an isolated island in the European 
gas ocean. Not only is the majority of gas transported in the Netherlands exported to 
foreign end-users, but apart from that have foreign owners a large stake in Dutch 
shippers. As a result, given the fact that the Dutch industry is not autarktic, part of the 
rents will always be distributed, or will always ‘leak’ away, to foreign consumers and 
shippers (or their shareholders). 
 
These three observations together have three important implications. First, state 
ownership implies that much rent allocation is simply a matter of circulating money from 
one government sub-budget to the other (Observation 1). Second, given that the industry 
is imperfectly competitive, part of the rents will not be passed on to the end-consumers 
(Observation 2). Third, it is unavoidable that a substantial part of the rents are transferred 
abroad (Observation 3).23 These broader implications will presumably also be important 
for the welfare distributions and efficiency gains of government policy in a wider 
                                                 
23 Strictly speaking, the third implication may not be an issue, as the government’s aim might be to allocate 
rents to end-consumers irrespective of where they live. Why would a, say, € 100 gas bill reduction be worth 
more for a Dutch end-consumer than for her or his companion in Germany, Greece, Russia or anywhere 
else? In effect, given economics’ law of decreasing marginal utility, this € 100 gas bill reduction may be 
more important for end-consumers in countries poorer than the Netherlands. However, in practice, this 
Utopian world view is not really dominant, to put it mildly. 
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European energy market. To determine this, more research using the analytic tools 
applied here to the case of shippers is needed, thus further extending the work of Egging 
and Gabriel (2006).  Restricting attention to the results of this paper, Table 4 summarizes 
the rent distribution results of our four scenario analyses, including the percentage of 
rents not received by Dutch end-consumers.24 Clearly, it is very likely that large 
percentages of the redistributed rents end up in the hands of the government (Observation 
1), shippers (Observation 2) or foreigners (Observation 3), and are not allocated to the 
(Dutch) end-consumers.25 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
24 Because our sensitivity analyses produced outcomes very similar the Scenarios A and B, we decided not 
to report them in Table 6, for the sake of brevity. 
25 A fourth observation is that if foreign ownership in the Dutch gas chain increases, so will the size of the 
‘leakages’, provided that part of the rent is passed along to end-consumers, as is clear from Table 5’s 
sensitivity analyses. 
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Table 1: Input-output table (payments in symbols) for the Dutch gas industry 
Paid to      Ai
Bi 
Imports
Bt 
(imports 
for 
transit) Ci
D1       
(GUTS)
Di              
(other shippers) Ei Fi
G1 
(GUTS)
Gi (other
suppliers
Hi      
(large vol.
takers> 
170.000 
m3/y
Hi    
(small end-
users <
170.000 
m3/y Ii Ji … … Mi
Agent
Ai
Bi
Ci
D1 X, Y & Z X T X, Y & Z X, Y & Z (TTF)
Di (i = 2 u/i  50) X & Z X T X & Z
Ei
Fi X X
G1 (GUTS) X, T, Y & Z X
Gi (other) X, T & Z X, T & Z X
Hi (i = 1 u/i 275) X X
Hi (i = 275 u/i  6 mln) X
Ii T & Y
Ji T & Z T & Z
….
….
Mi T & Y T & Z
Ai (i = 1 u/i 15)
Bi (i = 1 u/i  5)
Bt (t = 6 u/i 10)
Ci (i = 1 u/i 2)
D1 = 
Di (i = 2 u/i 50)
Ei (i = 1 u/i 30)
Fi (i = 1 u/i 400)
G1 =
Gi (i = 2 u/i 25)
Hi (i = 1 u/i 275)
Hi (i = 275 u/i 6 mln)
Ii ( i= 1 u/i 7) 
Ji (i = <10)
Mi (i= 1 u/i several mln)
GUTS GasUnieTrade&Supply
X=Domestic Payments in relation to gas for the sake of Dutch end-users
T=Transit Payments in relation to the transit of gas 
Y=Traditional Exports Payments in relation to traditional exports
Z= 'New exports' Payments in relation to 'new' exports
Domestic gas producers (NAM, BP, Petroland etc.)
Imports on behalf of inland end-consumers from e.g. Norway, GOS, UK
Foreign end-users
Transit = Imports on behalf of foreign gascompanies 
GTS Network and 'Zebra-pipeline'
GUTS as a  Shipper
Other Shippers
Regional net operators
Directly connected end-users
Traditional foreign customers of Gasunie (Snam, Ruhrgas, Distrigas etc.)
New foreign customers of Dutch gas (Stadtwerk Hannover etc.)
GUTS as a supplier to foreign customers and large volume takers in the Netherlands
Other suppliers
Large volume takers in a Dutch sales area (> 170.000 m3/yr, but not being the directly connected end-users)
Small end-users in a Dutch sales area (<170.000 m3/yr)
Through various 
downstream the gas 
is finally being 
delivered to the 
foreign end-users 
Starting point upstream gas chain is always a domestic or 
foreign gasproducer
End nodes of the domestic 
gas chain
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Table 2: Distribution of net benefits in Scenarios A and B 
 Net benefits (in million euro per year) 
(Group of) agent(s) Scenario A 
Perfect Collusion Case 
Scenario B 
Perfect Competition Case 
Government – 36.00 – 60.00 
Dutch shippers 19.07 0.00 
Foreign shippers 16.93 0.00 
Dutch end-consumers 0.00 40.00 
Foreign end-consumers 0.00 20.00 
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Table 3: Distribution of net benefits in Scenarios C and D 
 Net benefits (in million euro per year) 
(Group of) agent(s) Scenario C 
Dominance Erosion Case 
Scenario D 
Retaliation Response Case 
Government – 36.38 – 48.49 
Dutch shippers 19.17 9.12 
Foreign shippers 17.21 8.16 
Dutch end-consumers 0.00 20.80 
Foreign end-consumers 0.00 10.40 
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Table 4: The simulation outcomes summarized 
 Scenario 
Group of agents A. Perfect 
Collusion 
B. Perfect 
Competition 
C. Dominance 
Erosion 
D. Retaliation 
Response 
Government – 36.00 – 60.00 – 36.38 – 48.49 
Dutch shippers 19.07 0.00 19.17 9.12 
Foreign shippers 16.93 0.00 17.21 8.16 
Dutch end-consumers 0.00 40.00 0.00 20.80 
Foreign end-consumers 0.00 20.00 0.00 10.40 
Percentage not received 
by Dutch end-consumers 
100% 33% 100% 57% 
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 Figure 1: Five types of gas flows in and through the Netherlands 
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